Radicalisation and moderation among European regionalist parties: The influence of state level structures on the demands of CiU, N-VA and SNP by Rijn, Thijs van
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Radicalisation and moderation among European regionalist parties 
The influence of state level structures on the demands of CiU, N-VA and SNP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thijs van Rijn  
Student number: 0778788 
Number of words:14721 
Supervisor: Prof. dr. Van Holsteyn 
Second examiner: Prof. dr. Koole 
Master thesis 
2 
 
Table of contents 
 
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………...3 
 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….3 
 
Research question……………………………………………………………………………...4 
 
Theoretical framework…………………………………………………………………………5 
 
Method………………………………………………………………………………………..11 
 
Case selection and data collection…………………………………………………………....13 
 
N-VA………………………………………………………………………………………….16 
 
SNP…………………………………………………………………………………………...23 
 
CiU……………………………………………………………………………………………30 
 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………37 
 
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………..41 
 
 
3 
 
Radicalisation and moderation among European regionalist parties 
The influence of state level structures on the demands of CiU, N-VA and SNP 
Abstract. Three regionalist parties, the Convergència i Unió, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie and the 
Scottish Nationalist Party have changed their position on autonomy over the years. This research 
looks at both external factors (other parties at the regional level, national actors, the public and the 
European Union) and internal factors (factions and party leaders) to see what caused these changes. 
A comparative-historical analysis reveals that especially influence at the regional and national 
level and faction alteration play a large role. The results have implications for the understanding of 
regionalist parties as well as niche parties in general.    
 
 
Introduction 
Regionalist parties become more and more engaged in regionalist and national politics, from 
the Swedish People’s Party of Finland to Lega Nord in Italy. They enter (sub)national 
governments, the percentage of votes for regionalist parties during national elections has 
nearly doubled in the past decades  (see Massetti 2009, 515; respectively Schakel, Hooghe 
and Marks forthcoming).A subset of these political parties openly advocates independence 
from the ‘mother state’. Among regionalist parties, there is a variety of positions on the 
autonomy issue, and parties changed position over time. Some parties became supporters of 
autonomy within a state instead of advocates of independence, others emphasized their 
abstract ideal of independence by making their plans more concrete. 
 Change in policy as a reaction on external and internal, or exogenous and endogenous, 
factors by political parties has been discussed a lot (Panebianco 1988, Harmel and Janda 
1994, Randall and Svåsand 2002). It remains unclear which direction the changes of political 
parties take: to more a more radicalised or to a more moderated point of view. With regard to 
external factors: it is still unclear what characteristics of cooperation between government 
levels, or among political parties, help to accommodate parties, and which features are 
irrelevant or counterproductive. The same is true for internal factors: a strong faction or party 
leader can modernise point of views on issues, but they may also make issue change more 
difficult.  
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 The reaction to external and internal factors depends on the type of party. Niche 
parties, in particular, seem to focus more on internal factors, such as general party members, 
instead of on external factors. The category nowadays includes a wide array of parties, such as 
communist, extreme-right and green parties (Schumacher, De Vries and Vis 2013, 465). 
While containing many characteristics of a niche party, regionalist parties are rarely included. 
Looking more closely at policy change in these parties, i.e. their position on autonomy, can 
reveal the factors that are more influential for regionalist parties and whether this particular 
group is deviant from other niche parties.  
 
Research question  
The research question will be: Why have the SNP and the CiU radicalised in their demands 
for autonomy while the N-VA has become more moderate? Several sub-questions illuminate 
the influence of the various factors and the process of policy change. First, to know why 
changes occurred, it needs to be clear how they occurred. How did the change occur: 
gradually or in multiple shocks? Did the change have initial supporters, only later followed by 
a majority, or was the party top capable of changing the party’s mind set at once? Secondly, 
was the regional or the national context with their different actors most influential? Thirdly, 
did party leaders only react on the need for change or were they actively working to establish 
it? 
 The research contributes to academic literature in two ways. First, the influence of 
multiple political layers on party change has been understudied. Most niche parties have been 
investigated at the national level and there was no reason to assume different behaviour at 
different political layers. Since regionalist parties focus on autonomy and actively participate 
at both levels, this research takes both the regional and the national level into account. 
Secondly, while internal and external factors have been studied heavily, most research looks 
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at only one set of factors (see for example Ezrow et al. 2010 and Schumacher, De Vries and 
Vis 2013 for different foci). Internal and external factors have been studied separately, leading 
to fragmented accounts on the underlying causes of party change.Because the factors have 
been examined in their respective vacuums, the influence of factors might have been 
overestimated as the ‘ignored’ factors have never been taken into account. 
 Explaining substantial policy changes is also important for the regionalist parties 
themselves. It gives them a possibility to reflect on their actions and it could enhance internal 
debate on the functioning of the party, including the power of the party elite vis-à-vis the 
other party members. For citizens, it is helpful to identify change in the position of parties as 
well as the factors that lead to it, particularly when these parties become more influential.   
  
Theoretical framework 
Radicalisation and moderation of niche parties have often been linked to extreme right, which 
has given both concepts a negative connotation. They can also be viewed as more neutral 
concepts: the shift away respectively towards an earlier specified reference point (Akkerman 
and Rooduijn 2014, 2-3; Van Spanje and Van der Brug 2007, 1032). As such, the concepts are 
being used to describe the substantial changes in niche parties. Since the comparison with a 
reference point is necessary, both concepts are used in relative terms instead of absolute terms 
(such as number of cases of violence in earlier research). Both radicalisation and moderation 
can be explained by looking at external and internal factors. Constraints by these two types of 
factors lead the party to another stance.  
Harmel and Janda (1994, 277) acknowledge the importance of taking into account 
both external and internal factors when it comes to change. A change in an external factor 
creates an opportunity for internal actors to act. According to Budge, Ezrow and McDonald 
(2010, 792), an external factor first weakens the dominant faction by making its stance less 
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convincing or successful. This creates an opportunity for another faction with a different 
opinion to blame the dominant faction on the one hand and convince others of its own stance 
on the other. By forcing the resignation of party leaders, other party members can achieve key 
positions and substitute the policy by their own preferred stance.  
 While the relationship between the two types of factors may be clear in the abstract, 
there has been much more debate on the questions which factor concretely contributes to 
policy change and what constitutes the causal mechanism between the factor and the actual 
change. First, the external factors, consisting of other parties’ presence, actors at the national 
level, the voters and the European Union, will be discussed, followed by internal factors, 
party leadership and the existence of factions. The factors have been chosen because they are 
at the one hand relevantprima facie and at the other hand widely discussed in literature, and 
thus helpful to answer the research question. 
Considering the first external factor, other political parties, it is important to note that 
they mainly play a role when the party elite directly or indirectly feels constrained by them. 
Therefore, not the entire party system but only the relationships between the party and other 
parties are relevant, and only when the former reacts upon the latter. Whether issue change 
occur  when a party can co-operate with other parties or when it feels opposed by them is 
unclear. According to Van Spanje and Van der Brug (2007, 1034) the nicheparties that cannot 
co-operate with other parties because they are excluded from negotiations, tend to radicalise 
in their demands. Niche parties will feel more hostile against the outside world and scepticism 
about co-operation may rise (idem 1023-1024). On the other hand, Meguid (2005, 354) states 
that when main-stream parties try to dismiss or accommodate the new party’s top issue, the 
new party itself will be weakened. Only when main-stream parties are adversarial towards a 
new party, the party can strengthen.Literature on regionalist parties, displays similar 
conflicting statements and results (Alonso 2012, 204).  
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With regard to the second external factor, the actors at the national level that can 
influence the level of centralization, such as the government and the judiciary, the literature is 
relatively scarce. The main question is whether more decentralisation or centralisation leads to 
more radical regionalist parties. Just as at the regional level, confrontation and cooperation of 
actors lead to a certain response, but the direction is unclear. Massetti and Schakel (2013, 10) 
state that decentralisation in general damage moderate regionalist parties, while more radical 
ones survive. This is an incentive for moderate parties to radicalise. The most likely 
alternative is to fall apart; regionalist parties that whole-heartedly decided to quit since their 
goal was achieved are very rare.On the other hand, Colino (2009) finds that it is the exclusion 
of any influence of regional powers at the national level and the lack of any decentralisation 
that leads to radicalisation. Since in those cases regional parties will focus on the regional 
level, where influence is already relatively large,  parties will become more radicalised 
(Alonso 2012, 213).  
In contrast to issues of other niche parties, such as environment and immigration, the 
importance of the autonomy issue for the population can be relatively easy detected. Due to 
the large saliency of the topic, polls with regard to the future of Belgium, Spain and the 
United Kingdom have been often conducted on a monthly basis (see for example British 
Polling Council 2014). The influence of the public opinion is as least as strong as election 
results: when the public changes its opinion or where one issue gains more saliency, it is 
likely that the party ideology is changed as well (see Adams et al. 2004, 608 and Curini and 
Hino 2012,479). When the public is moderate on the matter in polls or does not see it as the 
most important current issue, a party will moderate its own point of view. Regarding 
elections, the political party’s reaction is less predictable since it is more difficult for the party 
to know why it won or lost the election:if party leadership does not think it has something to 
do with an issue position, it will not directly change its point of view (Dalton and McAllister 
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2013, 18). Positive as well as negative election results may lead to the intensification of the 
demands; the former can have this effect if a party believes that its point of view reflects a 
large part of the population, the latter can have this effect if a party feels it cannot compete 
with the other parties on other topics.  
For niche parties a policy shift on an issue can be found as well, though those parties 
seem to focus more on a change of opinion among supporters instead of a general public 
(Ezrow et al. 2010, 288).  Parties with an activist background in which general party members 
play a large role seem to focus on party voters even more (Schumacher 2013, 9). These two 
characteristics make it less likely that a niche party will moderate its policy: it does not want 
to lose its core voters and its ideals, even if it could attract a new public. If any change is 
deemed necessary because of bad elections results or negative polls, radicalisation is seen as a 
possibility to ‘strengthen’ the party while core and ideology are not alienated. 
 A fourth external factor, the increase of influence of the European Union, has been 
investigated heavily. The Treaty of Nice (entry into force in 2003) and particularly the Treaty 
of Lisbon (entry into force in 2009) have strengthened the role of the EU within the member 
states and the position of the European Parliament (and indirectly political parties) towards 
other EU institutions.According to Ladrech (2012, 582), the European dimension leads to 
more complexity and hence uncertainty on the one hand, and problems with “opinion 
congruence” between the party and the public, and among the party’s factions. In order to 
decrease uncertainty, the best party leaders can do is sending party delegates to the European 
Parliament and downplaying EU saliency by focusing on national instead of European issues. 
However, Dardanelli (2012) states that regionalist parties can profit from EU integration: the 
national state can be ‘sandwiched’ between Europe and regions, and the EU can confer 
powers and rights to such regions. As a result, the regionalist parties may respond very 
positively to the European Union and want their future state to become a member of it 
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(Dardanelli 2012). However, the parties in regions most suffering from ‘regional blindness’ 
from the national level, i.e. regions that feel neglected, may have less confidence in gaining 
influence at the EU level through the national level than those parties that are heard at the 
national level (see for example Fasone 2013, 147; Griglio 2013). As a consequence, the 
former are more likely to want to achieve independence than the latter. This is especially of 
interest after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, which allowed regions to participate 
more decisively in the decision-making process (Kiiver 2012). Moreover, while EU policy 
formally affects all member states to the same degree (with the notable exception of the UK, 
which decided to opt out in areas such as Schengen and the Euro), political parties in 
neglected areas feel less EU presence and can be less optimistic about what the EU can do for 
them (see Caruso 2011). 
 Looking at the internal factors, the variation among different party types needs to be 
acknowledged. Panebianco (1988, 56-57) grasps the interdependence among the various party 
actors by looking at the “formalized structure”. The higher the degree of systemness, the more 
the party is homogenous and the smaller the amount of autonomy available for party actors 
and vice versa. A crisis in one of the party actors will more easily spread through the entire 
party. Panebianco’s various degrees of systemness correspond with hierarchy respectively 
stratarchy that can be found in different party types (Katz and Mair 1995, 18). While the 
catch-all party was hierarchical in nature (with members as “organized cheearleaders”), the 
cartel party was more ‘stratarchical’, offering the party actors “mutual autonomy”. More 
emphasis is placed on the individual member instead of on the organised body. Bolleyer 
(2011) envisages a continuum of absolute hierarchy at one end of the spectrum, stratarchy in 
the middle and a party federation at the other end; a federation being a cooperation between 
local parties at the one hand and a national party at the other, although the concept can be 
used for the loose arrangement among two regional parties at the regional level as well. 
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 Instead of categorisation, it is easier to place niche parties somewhere along the 
hierarchy-party federation continuum. With regard to the relationship between party members 
and the party elite, Schumacher, De Vries and Vis (2013, 464) place niche parties on a 
continuum from leadership-dominated parties to activist-dominated parties. While in the 
former, a few veto players at the top decide on policy (change), in the latter the party 
members have a decisive say in the party’s policy.  According to Schumacher, De Vries and 
Vis (2013, 470), niche parties with different ideology share the same activist-dominated 
attitude. Policy of niche parties seems to follow party supporters much more than the general 
public. The strength of the party members can be decisive in both candidate selection and 
issues of substance. The appointment of a party leader can take place in a number of ways, 
but niche parties in general give all party members the opportunity to vote on those who run 
for party leader. Building on the activist-based party concept, Lehrer (2012, 1312-1313) 
claims that the inclusiveness of party members in the selection procedure (in contrast to the 
possibility of appointing a party leader by few), leads to a policy response that is in 
concordance with the members’ general opinion. This is reinforced by discussing policy and 
policy changes during conferences (see for example Greene and Haber 2015, 19). 
Another manifestation of the activist attitude of niche parties is the existence of 
factions. A faction is considered to be a group with a specific identity that pursues its own 
goals next to party goals; in contrast to an ordinary ‘grassroots members force’ members of 
various party ranks can be part of it (see specifically Zariski 1960, 33; but also Boucek 2009, 
458; Wauters 2014, 68). A faction can either enhance party strength or weaken it by its own 
actions: Boucek distinguishes between cooperative, competitive and degenerative factions 
(2009, 470). Both the rivalry among factions and the coherence in a faction are crucial: a 
young dominant faction is more likely to alter the party when ideological differences with 
other factions are large and the coherence in the faction is strong (Harmel and Tan 2003, 421). 
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For niche parties, the flexibility of the executive due to formal and informal linkages to party 
members gives dissatisfaction an ‘exhaust valve’. However, a relatively weak executive with 
a high turnover rate, may also be prone to factions that are relatively well organised (Ezrow et 
al. 2010, 279). 
Other scholars claim it is the policy substance instead of party organisation that 
differentiates niche parties from other parties. According to Adams et al. (2006, 513), niche 
parties are considered to offer a “non-centrist” or even extreme ideology, be it environmental, 
communist or extreme-right. Meguid (2005, 348) on the other hand states that it is the limited 
number of issues that differentiates niche parties from mainstream parties. In that sense, niche 
parties can be considered to be single- issue parties; it solves the conceptual problem that a 
party with two related non-economic issues cannot be considered to be a single- issue party 
anymore, since it can still be viewed as a niche party (see also Mudde 1999). Wagner (2012, 
863) tries to fuse these two definitions of substance and scale into one, stating that niche 
parties can be considered to be parties pursuing a few non-economic issues. Regionalist 
parties can be described as niche parties by looking at both party organisation and substance. 
They often have activist party members and open leadership elections and they focus on the 
non-economic issue of autonomy. 
 
Method 
Each of the parties under study has its own idiosyncrasies, but by investigating the above 
mentioned factors in each case, this explorative research can discover which factors seem to 
have an influence and which not. Comparative-historical analysis both recognises 
peculiarities, as its main goal is to explain the outcome of specific cases, but also looks at the 
impact of explanatory variables in a certain set of cases (Mahoney 2003, 337). The analysis 
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focuses on causality, by investigating processes over time, which are illuminated by 
systematic comparison (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, 6).  
Before the comparative-historical analysis is made, the existence of causal 
mechanisms per specific case needs to be established (Mahoney 2003, 363).This can be done 
by process-tracing. According to Collier, process-tracing is essentially an adequate 
description of “snapshots at a series of specific moments”, which are placed in the right order 
(2011, 824). In this way, points in time are reserved for process-tracing, while change is only 
analysed thereafter. George and Bennett (2005, 210-212) discuss several varieties of process-
tracing on a continuum between a detailed case description and an abstract explanation. The 
analytical causal explanation, which they place in the middle, focuses on the one hand at 
factors “that are thought to be particularly important” while on the other hand it takes into 
account any peculiarity of the case. This corresponds with the theory-building process-tracing 
variant of Beach and Brun Pederson (2012, 25), in which a correlation between variables is 
expected to exist, but the causal mechanism is unclear. Guala (2010, 1071) combines the 
advantages of process-tracing with comparison, resulting in “comparative process-tracing”. 
When a causal mechanism is foundin one case, the main nodes should be cross-checked in 
other cases.  
The analysis can limit the number of factors by focusing whether they are necessary or 
sufficient to achieve a certain outcome, even if only a small number of cases is under study. 
The snapshots reveal when and to what extent the factors and the dependent variable altered 
over time. George and Bennett state that an explicit link between a factor and the dependent 
variable is indispensable to confirm the influence of some factors and to eliminate others. 
Collier agrees, although his ‘links’ are more implicit, which broadens the number of 
influential factors and introduces a degree in likelihood that the factor is influential, which is 
wrongly confused with a degree in influence. 
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 By selecting on the dependent variable, it remains unknown whether those 
independent variables that  exist in cases where there is change are actually lacking in cases 
where there is no change at all (Geddes 1990, 132). This problem is partially forestalled by 
including parties that change in opposite directions (N-VA and CiU) and a party that changes 
relatively little (SNP). Regional parties without any change have not been selected. While the 
problem may be insurmountable for testing theories, it does not prevent cases to identify 
causal variables or present anomalies in current theories (Geddes 1990, 149). When a change 
occurs, the influence of the relevant external or internal factor or factors prior to (or in some 
cases subsequent to) the change will be established by looking at the way the factor influences 
the party behaviour. Data triangulation, using a variety of information can on the one hand 
bring insights into both the change and the influence of the factor, and on the other hand 
increase validity (Ellis et al. 2006, 47).Different information sources show which information 
is biased and should be treated more carefully. 
Per case, a description of the policy process over time is given, in which phenomena 
of the factors are situated in chronological order.At the end of each case, the analysis links the 
policy change with relevant factors. Unexpected but seemingly relevant phenomena will be 
taken into account, but irrelevant factors will not. First the case of the N-VA will be 
discussed, followed by the SNP and the CiU. 
 
Case selection and data collection 
In order to capture the diversity of regionalist parties, three parties with different values of the 
various factors and dependent variable are chosen: the N-VA, the SNP and the CiU. 
According to Seawright and Gerring (2008, 297), such a picking method ensures a minimal 
level of representativeness, since the full variation of the population is shown; it is often used 
in exploratory studies. The three parties differ from each other with regard to, inter alia, their 
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size in the regional parliament, their position in regional governments, the national actors they 
encountered, and the strength of general party members and factions. A more pragmatic point 
to choose these parties is that the party secretariat of the three parties has been rather stable, 
allowing for the obtaining of information of fifteen years ago. 
The object of analysis in this study is the change in the position on autonomy of the 
CiU, the N-VA and the SNP. The objects of observation are the documents in which the 
parties express their opinions. These documents should cover the whole time period from 
2000s onwards, starting with the establishment of the party in the case of the CiU and the N-
VA or with a document that repositions the party in the case of the SNP. Process-tracing 
demands an uninterrupted time period; would there be interrupted periods they would be 
‘black boxes’ in which the links between factors and dependent variable is unknown. This 
would make it impossible to combine two separate time periods. Articles of association, 
manifestos and statements of policy, which are published by the establishment of the party, 
can provide the valuable information, particularly when they are rewritten in a later stage of 
time. Through election programmes, the whole time period is covered. The three parties 
published such a document almost every election, be it on the European, the national or the 
subnational level. One needs to be aware that different elections result in a different program 
style, so any document will be compared with documents covering the same election, if 
necessary. As a result, the number of programmes per party ranges from seven to ten. Apart 
from these documents, association magazines often include the opinion of party members 
who are part of the board or specific committees, but also of the average party member and 
they may show internal discussions. When an external factor changed or newspapers report 
internal party trouble, these documents can easily be selected.The N-VA publishes Volle 
manen and Nieuw-Vlaams Magazine, the The Scots Independentis edited by SNP party 
members (such as former SNP leader Halliday) and supports the SNP at the elections, and the 
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SNP got its own magazine, Independence, recently. The CiU has a lot of blogs, an electronic 
bulletin and even an own video channel. Finally, three documents show the strategies of the 
parties in their most elaborated form at this moment. These documents are relevant since they 
show a possible change since the last elections and therefore they should be included. The 
SNP has publicised Scotland’s Future, which it sees as the blue print for an independent 
Scotland. Similarly, the CiU expressed its opinions in two main documents: Catalunya 2020 
and the Agreement for Freedom.  The N-VA released Verandering voor Vooruitgang (Change 
for Progress). The Catalan and Flemish documents are electoral programmes, while the 
Scottish document can be seen as a ‘referendum programme’. When combined with and 
compared to these major texts, quotes from newspaper articles and interviews with party 
members who were responsible for change could reveal any inconsistencies. See for the 
interviewees Appendix I.  
With regard to the factors that lead to these changes, party documents are not the main 
source due to their inherent bias towards the party’s point of views. While these particular 
sources do not provide a neutral description of the factor, these reactions do show that the 
party pays attention to the factor and that more information on the factor is required. The 
source of information that leads to the tracing of a causal mechanism differs per factor, since 
the links between the regionalist party and the factor differ in nature: some links are actively 
sought by a party elite while other links are established independently of the party’s action. 
Information on the role of other parties can come from documents in which there actions are 
described, e.g. votes in the regional parliament respectively coalition agreements between 
parties in which the regional party is excluded. Apart from that, quotes from spokesmen of 
other parties in newspaper articles may also reveal amity or animosity among parties. Over 
the years, the public opinion has been measured by a variety of polling institutions and 
academic institutions. The overall image of the opinion polls can be used to see the 
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development of the public opinion factor. Documents concerning the third external factor, 
which deals with cooperation at the national level, cannot be found: since the meetings were 
largely held behind closed doors, information is only acquired indirectly from the two 
negotiating sides and the final negotiation document.  
For the internal factors, formal rules are all nicely described in party manifests, but 
informal practices are less visible and need to be revealed by investigating the daily 
operations and daily worries of the party (for example during conferences) and statements of 
party members in the party magazine and in newspaper articles. None of the three parties 
excludes discussion, thereby giving room to express existing differences in opinion among 
members and the appearance of a dominant opinion. The interviews may also lead to 
information on informal party practices. While the substance may be biased, criticism of party 
members on the basis of party line or on other members reveals first of all that there actually 
is disagreement within the party and secondly the topic of debate.  The more members join 
the discussion and the more important the position of the critical member is, the more critical 
the position of the party leader or party organisation is, and the more coherent the faction. The 
key point is that in internal debates or power struggles, the statements of party members 
represent the individual or faction, instead of the party, since they address other party 
members. Information on internal affairs can be supported by party documents concerning the 
election of party leaders or congress motions, the number of opponents for various party 
positions and group discipline in parliament. 
 
N-VA: “Nil volentibus arduum” 
Autonomywas the main content of the N-VA’s one-page declaration of principles. In the strife 
for a more perfect Flanders, the party “logically [chose] for an independent Flanders, 
member state of a democratic Europe” (N-VA 2001a, bold by the N-VA). The Flemish 
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nationalism the party exhibits was not an end in itself, but a means to get a better functioning 
democracy and a better government (N-VA 2001b, 2). A year after the party’s foundation, its 
message was confirmed by the first ‘general congress’ of the party on the 5th  of May 2002 
(N-VA 2002).The first elections in which the N-VA took part were the national general 
elections on the 18th of May 2003, proposing inter alia a “Flemish voice” instead of “Belgian 
cacophony” at the European level (N-VA 2003, 6).  
 A year later, on the 13th of June, the Flemish and European elections were held on the 
same day. With similar phrases and arguments as in the last election program, the party 
strived in the Flemish elections for a “free Flemish state” (N-VA 2004a, 5-6). In the European 
election program the rationale was further explained:the Flemish government “has little or no 
role to play” in the national decision-making procedure (N-VA 2004b, 2). The party did not 
alter its position, despite of losing half of the seats at the last national elections. The party did 
search, however,for cooperation with other parties. In the summer of 2003, the party council 
decided to have a closer look at cartel proposals of Christen-Democratic & Vlaams (CD&V). 
On Valentine’s Day, itannounced that the party and CD&V agreed with each other on the 
cartel conditions. According to mr. Loones, this was not only due to the autonomy issue, “but 
also because both parties place much emphasis on the community. The N-VA thought the 
CD&V was the party with whom we could jump furthest.” 
In the 2004 elections, the N-VA passed the 5% threshold in the electoral districts and 
received six seats in the Flemish Parliament. A new Flemish government was formed by the 
N-VA, CD&V, the socialist party sp.a and the liberal parties SPIRIT and Vld. N-VA party 
leader Bourgeois became minister and was succeeded by Bart De Wever, who won the 
internal leadership elections. His position has been unquestioned: in the three leadership 
elections in which he participated, he was the only candidate and he received 95% of the votes 
or more (N-VA 2014a). According to mr. Loones, “the tension between the party elite and the 
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members has been diminished [in comparison with the N-VA’s predecessor]. The party leader 
tells the story from the party base. Apart from that, the party had to grow at the local level 
while it was already established at the top, so it was easier to implement our ideas from the 
start”. Party members can formally amend party documents at congresses, but in practice the 
party council, via de local chapters, has control over which amendments are accepted (see for 
example N-VA 2014b). 
 The N-VA’s election program at the 2007 national elections differed from earlier 
programs. It still criticised some issues: no state reforms had taken place and main topics 
should still be transferred to the regional level (N-VA 2007; 3, 5). The party still wanted an 
independent Flanders, but stated it would only be achieved “eventually”. For the first time, 
however, the party opted for a confederal state model, in which the pith of the matter of 
competencies as well as resources rests with the regions (N-VA 2007, 8). The cartel with the 
CD&V, which had been on the brink of collapse in 2006 but hastily repaired by De Wever, 
was still intact for these elections.De Wever still favoured independence, “but not at all 
costs”. When Vlaams Belang wanted to debate in the Chamber on the split-up of Belgium 
during the government formation, the N-VA abstained, stating that the party wanted to 
achieve independence by means of working within the cabinet (Belgische Kamer van 
Volksvertegenwoordigers 2007). 
  
Not in the national government, still in power 
During the campaigns for the Flemish and European elections of 2009, the N-VA mentioned 
this goal only once in the election program, when the Flemish influence in Europe had been 
judged to be too small (N-VA 2009a, 69-70). The party focused on more pragmatic and socio-
economic concerns of citizens, while not including confederal issues. The N-VA became part 
of the new government, together with CD&V and sp.a. Although the government could not 
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arrange institutional reform, its intentions to increase the stature of Flanders are made clear by 
the government agreement: “A decisive Flanders in decisive times”.The statement of prime-
minister Peeters emphasised that “a thorough state reform is and remains a necessary 
instrument for a policy that is more in line with the regions” and that “the Flemish 
government will use its constitutional competences to the utmost” (CD&V, N-VA, sp.a 2009, 
108).  
During the 2007-2008 government formation, state reform was on the table and the N-
VA played a large role during the negotiations.It decided not to take part in anoverall rightist 
government. Nevertheless, the party was able to exert pressure on the government with regard 
to institutional reforms. According to the government agreement, “these past months, it has 
been noticed that a new step towards the reform of our institutions is desirable” (CD&V et al. 
2008, 41-42). According to mr. Van Dijck, “Walloon parties feared that the N-VA would 
knock on the government’s door if the parties did not assent to a certain degree with the 
Flemish parties. CD&V was carrying a big stick”. 
On the 21st  of September, the N-VA decided to end the cartel with CD&V, stating that 
CD&V did too little to accomplish state reform. According to mr. Loones, “both CD&V and 
Open Vld became more Flemish. Not necessarily because of the N-VA, but more as a 
consequence of the state we live in. Still, this has made cooperation easier.” According to mr. 
Loones, both parties agreed on the need for more autonomy, although “while the N-VA is 
more focused upon the content of autonomy, other parties have used the issue more as a 
strategy than that they really wanted change. The break-up was not just purely opportunistic, 
the cartel offered a safe spot as well. But CD&V already thought the decentralisation was 
more or less complete, while the N-VA wanted further autonomy. But this was a key moment, 
since there was an opportunity for us to become a government party. Eventually, it was time 
20 
 
to play for the marbles.” The choice was defended in the magazine, in which CD&V was 
criticised about its role in state reform (N-VA 2009b, 13). 
In 2009, the European Union made it possible for regional parliaments to play a role in 
EU decision-making, by increasing their veto rights (Art. 6 (2) of Protocol 2European Union 
2010). The N-VA acknowledged this improvement, stating that ‘constitutional regions’ 
should be able to co-decide on those issues that are of major importance for them. As a result, 
the N-VA deemed immediate independence to be not necessary anymore as long as Belgium 
is willing to accept the powers of the regional parliaments (N-VA 2009a, 70).  
The downsizing of the issue of autonomy in the program for the general elections in 
2010 was in line with the previous programs. For 2010, the year in which Belgium was 
president of the Council of the European Union, as well as for the nearby future, the N-VA 
emphasised that Flanders and Wallonia should work together in a confederal system (N-VA 
2010; 6, 9). The party presented it as a “Copernican revolution”, in which “the [policies] in 
this country need to turn over and the regions should be given all the competences that are 
relevant to meet the large challenges of our time” (N-VA 2010, 64).  
The 2010 program was preceded by a tripling of the number of seats for the N-VA in 
the Flemish Parliament and the formation of a Flemish coalition between CD&V, sp.a and the 
N-VA in 2009. By looking more closely at the ‘butterfly agreement’, it can be seen that the 
N-VA was able to influence it heavily, although the party did not enter government and did 
not support the constitutional reforms that were in it.The N-VA negotiated with the other 
parties for over a year, and substantial partial agreements were taken care of. The very title of 
the document was “A more efficient federal state and a larger autonomy for the regions” 
(Institutioneel akkoord 2011). According to mr. Van Dijck, “the solution of ‘kieskring 
Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde’ led on the one hand to a less intense debate on autonomy, but all 
other topics became more interwoven with autonomy. The Walloon parties do not lie awake 
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because of Belgium, and therefore the other Flemish party became more focused upon 
Flanders, also because the electorate had become more Flanders minded. So they reach out 
more easily to us”. 
The election program for the national, European and Flemish elections in 2014, 
Verandering voor Vooruitgang, elaborated on the confederal system. According to the N-VA, 
“if we want to change the [state’s institutions]structurally, we need to change the structures” 
(N-VA 2014b, 48). De Wever referred to the confederal model as being “the ideal image” (N-
VA 2014c, 9). 
 
Table I. Important events for the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie 
Year Event Influence 
2004 Cartel with the CD&V and subsequent 
party in the Flemish coalition 
+ 
2004 De Wever was elected as party leader ++ 
2007-
2008 
National government formation ++ 
2008 End of cartel - 
2009 Party in Flemish coalition in its own 
right 
- 
2010-
2011 
National government formation ++ 
++ = large influence, + = some influence, - = no influence  
 
The N-VA’s periods of moderation were preceded by influence at both the regional and the 
national level, and were accompanied by a strong party leader. The N-VA experienced two 
types of influence. There was cooperation with other parties, particularly within the cartel 
with the CD&V from 2004 till 2008 but also in the Flemish governments from 2004 when the 
N-VA acted as a junior party. The party, however, did not really moderate its opinion due to 
this cooperation; during the 2004-2007 period it remained relatively stable. When the cartel 
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with CD&V fell apart, the party did not go back to earlier independence statements.The 
second type was national recognition of the need for more autonomy. Although the party 
stayed out of the national government in both 2007 and 2010, it was able to further its 
interests of more autonomy, as both government programs show. This had more effect on the 
party line: the Flemish and European election programs of 2009 were less ideologically based 
than earlier programs, even compared to the same type of elections.Important to note is that 
the combination of proposals for a confederal system have replaced the blue-print for an 
independent Flanders, just as the right for Flanders to act on the European stage has replaced 
the need to become independent as soon as possible. The party even argued that much of what 
it proposed is already day-to-day reality in Belgium, thereby reducing the need for 
independence. 
 Since the N-VA originated at the national level, the party needed to create local 
chapters and an internal party structure while already growing electorally. The result is a top-
down organisation in which the party elite, and especially the party leader Bart De Wever, has 
many formal and informal contacts with party members. The absence of factions based on 
ideology or local interests, makes it easier for the party elite to change policy and to present it 
as a fait accompli for which the party members only have to vote, as for example the 
establishment of the cartel showed. This is not necessarily negative: the position of De Wever 
has been unquestioned and no internal party struggles have occurred, giving the party elite the 
room to manoeuvre on the issue of autonomy. 
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SNP: “A strong SNP means a strong Scotland” 
Since the SNP’s foundation, the party has envisaged more autonomy for Scotland. When the 
first regional elections were held in 1999 for the newly established Scottish Parliament, the 
party did not alter its content. It pursued the line taken in the earlier national elections, 
focusing on independence as a measure of autonomy. According to both election programs, 
Scotland needed to change. Over time, lack of cooperation at the regional level and a 
willingness to cooperate at the national level, as well as large internal pressure, led to an SNP 
that campaigned for independence. 
While it was a Labour government that provided Scotland the new political 
institutions, the SNP did not credit the party for that. A SNP member stated that “Labour had 
to establish the Parliament, since there was such discontent in Scotland”. According to the 
SNP, both the Conservatives and Labour had acted surprisingly similar, by keeping the 
system the same (SNP 1997, 4; SNP 1999, 2). In both election programs, the focus was on 
pragmatic, concrete improvements of the lives of Scots (SNP 1999). The party argues that 
“[b]y definition a devolved Parliament is limited in what it can do” and therefore, 
independence will eventually be necessary for large macroeconomic policies and the like 
(SNP 1999, 13). However, “independence is not an aim on its own” (SNP 1997, 11; see also 
SNP 1999). 
 When Alex Salmond stood down as party leader in 2000, the two wings of the SNP, 
the gradualists and the fundamentalists, both wanted to provide the next party leader. While 
both factions have eventually aspired to achieve Scottish independence, the gradualists and 
the fundamentalists have opposed each other with regard to the speed of the split-up. As the 
name already implies, the gradualists have been more moderate about the issue: they wanted 
Scotland to acquire more powers until the break with the United Kingdom would be nothing 
more than a formality. The fundamentalists actually wanted independence as soon as possible. 
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The upcoming leadership’s elections formed an arena for both party wings; eventually John 
Swinney, a well-known gradualist, was chosen instead of his main contestant Alex Neil. For 
the elections, he stated that “[t]his is the Scotland we have, and we have to be creative enough 
as a country to take all the decisions”.i The SNP acknowledged that independence did not 
come instantly (SNP 2001). 
The loss put Swinney in a difficult position, since he had to satisfy both the 
increasingly loud fundamentalists and the gradualists. The 2003 regional election program 
devoted the first chapter on more autonomy and the SNP promised a referendum if the party 
gained office (SNP 2003, 2). The party lost twenty per cent of its seats in the Scottish 
Parliament. Internal debates whether this was the result of a declined interest in Scottish 
independence remained indecisive,since some argued that smaller nationalist parties were able 
to gain some seats (see The Scots Independent 2003). While the personal attacks by the 
fundamentalist wing of the party began to grow, Swinney did not pursue a more moderate 
position. For the European elections, which were held a year later, the SNP arguedtherefore 
that “[d]evolved parliaments within member states like the UK have no real say” and 
“regional status will always be second best” (SNP 2004, 8). This criticism on the national 
level was accompanied by the rhetoric question why a small state like Malta was a new EU 
member state, while Scotland’s interest were neglected (SNP 2004, 22). 
 The European elections were the first elections since 1997 where the party did not lose 
any seats (not counting the 1999 regional elections were it was impossible to lose). However, 
many SNP members saw the four Swinney years as disappointing. Cooperation with other 
parties was not established: despite being the second party in Parliament, the party had not 
tried to become part of government and Labour and the Liberal Democrats found each other 
very quickly instead of reaching out. Aside a few small successes, autonomy had not been 
enlarged. 
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Alex Salmond had not disappeared: since 2001, he was MP at Westminster and even 
when Swinney was formally declared National Convener, he needed to fight ‘Salmond’s 
shadow’ at any intern party struggle.He did not do well in the media, was challenged as party 
leader in September 2003, and right after the 2004 European elections, Swinney declared that 
he would resign: “I have come to the view that the SNP cannot make the electoral progress I 
believe is possible, if our vital political message is communicated through an endless debate 
of my leadership”.iiAccording to mr. Smith “the party had a lot of growing up to do since 
1999. Swinney did professionalise the party, but not without problems. The 
professionalization emphasized the rule of the party leader and some SNP members were still 
‘amateurs’.” Three months later, Alex Salmond was again elected party leader by more than 
75% of the votes.  
 
A fiercer tone 
The 2005 general elections program had a fiercer tone. Independence would be good, since 
“most people in Scotland want the Scottish Parliament to have more powers” (SNP 2005, 2). 
The party tried to let the voters identify the SNP with Scotland: “A strong SNP means a 
strong Scotland” (SNP 2005, 2). It envisioned how independence would help Scotland: 
“[i]ndependence would mean that all the important decisions about our country, from the 
economy to foreign policy, would be taken in Scotland” (SNP 2005, 2).  
 Although the SNP lost the elections, Alex Salmond’s leadership was not questioned. 
The party line, however, was still much debated. In 2006, the party was split over the question 
whether a referendum should be held immediately when the SNP would be part of the 
Scottish government (see for example The Scots Independent 2007). While the gradualists, 
among them Gordon Wilson, former party leader, and Nicola Sturgeon, deputy leader of the 
party, argued that a referendum should only be held when there was a clear majority, 
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fundamentalists accused them that they only wanted devolution instead of independence. 
Salmond tried to find a compromise: there would be a referendum if the SNP formed of the 
government, but only in 2010.According to Salmond, “the key argument is about the SNP 
building up credibility in government, which is the essential requirement to win an 
independence referendum”.iii At the referendum, the Scottish people would be asked about 
independence, not devolution. There would be only two possible answers: yes and no. 
 In order to elucidate the statement about a referendum, the 2007 regional election 
program defined independence more concretely, since the plans openly referred to the post-
independence era. SNP leader Salmond openly declared that he wanted to become the next 
First Minister; one of his main priorities was the publication of a White Paper with a detailed 
concept on Scottish independence. A referendum was scheduled for 2010 (SNP 2007; 5, 8). 
The elections led to a minority government for the SNP, led by now First Minister Salmond. 
Without negotiating with other parties, the SNP government published multiple 
documents on independence. The documents did talk about political cooperation, but a closer 
look reveals that even in 2007, these types of documents were used to elaborate on the SNP’s 
vision. According to the document that should clarify the “National Conversation”, it was the 
SNP that published its own “consultation paper” on independence, the SNP’s estimates on 
economic growth were being used, and it was this party that “made specific proposals[on state 
reform]”. The Scottish branches of both the Labour Party and the Conservatives were only 
mentioned once; according to the document, they had no real inclination to act. The document 
that was used to sum up the conversation stated that the establishment of the Scottish National 
Party could be considered to be part of “Scotland’s constitutional journey” (Scottish 
Government 2009, 8). According to mr. Smith, “other parties could have come up with other 
plans, but they did not. There was cooperation on other topics, but none of the parties wanted 
27 
 
to talk about autonomy. Cooperation has declined over the last few years due to the 
importance of the referendum.” 
The subsequent 2009 European elections were mainly used to present the people the 
claimed successes of the SNP government (SNP 2009). The program for the national elections 
in 2010 dealt with much of the same issues as the EU program. By focusing on the 
accomplishments of the Scottish government and blaming ‘Westminster’ for most that had 
gone wrong, the party was openly arguing for independence instead of explaining why SNP 
MPs should be elected to the House of Commons. “Independence runs like a golden thread 
through this manifesto and underpins the policies that will have the biggest impact on our 
prosperity and wellbeing” (SNP 2010, 22). The possibility of further devolution was now cut 
off: if an opposition party wanted to talk about it, the SNP would consider it, but the party 
itself did not seem to believe in more autonomy anymore (SNP 2010, 18). However, it 
immediately acknowledged that such a proposal cannot be expected. “The SNP wants 
Scotland to enjoy the full responsibilities of independence” (SNP 2010, 17). 
Even before the regional elections of 2011, there were signs that the SNP wanted to 
hold a referendum. It will not come as a surprise that the SNP positively evaluated the four 
years in which it was in office in Scotland. According to the party, devolution has had its 
worth, since it gave the SNP the opportunity to express its opinion and eventually to alter 
policies. But the main plans of the party could only be achieved when Scotland is independent 
(SNP 2011, 40). The SNP received an absolute majority in Parliament, 69 out of 129 
seats.The SNP’s victory turned out to be a mixed blessing. Pressure within the party 
necessitated action by Alex Salmond (The Scot Independent 2011). He did not live up to his 
promise to hold a referendum in his first term of office.  His main argument was the fact that 
the SNP simply did not have a majority in Parliament and therefore could not pass any 
specific referendum bill. Since no (large) other party was willing to vote in favour of such a 
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bill, this was indeed a problem. But the absolute majority solved it, and Salmond could not 
resist the questions of the fundamentalists any longer. According to mr. Smith, “Salmond 
wanted the referendum as late as possible, since the people of Scotland needed to think on the 
issue”.  
However, the British government was more than willing to cooperate with the 
SNP.The negotiators on state reform were the executives. The SNP did not need any other 
party to agree with it. On the 15th of October 2012, “the United Kingdom Government and the 
Scottish Government have agreed to work together to ensure that a referendum on Scottish 
independence can take place” (Edinburgh Agreement 2012). In 2013, Scotland’s Future was 
published, in which the SNP identified itself with Scotland, the Scottish population and 
independence. The document of almost seven hundred pages was full of advantages of 
independence;according to the SNP, the few disadvantages could be overcome easily. 
 
Table II. Important events for the Scottish National Party 
Year Event Influence 
2000 Election of Swinney as 
party leader 
- 
2004 Unrest among SNP 
factions and subsequent 
election of Salmond as 
party leader 
++ 
2006 Unrest in the SNP about 
the date of a 
referendum 
++ 
2007 The SNP forms a 
minority government 
+ 
2011 The SNP forms a 
majority government 
+ 
2011 Pressure on Salmond to 
hold a referendum 
++ 
++ = large influence, + = some influence, - = no influence  
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The radicalisation of the SNP can be directly attributed to internal party politics. What stands 
out is that unrest among party factions or within the party in general, led to a reaction by the 
party leadership to modify policy. Since Swinney and Salmond were elected by SNP 
members instead of the party establishment, they needed to take the wishes of both the 
gradualists and the fundamentalists into account.Swinney, for example, took a firmer tone on 
the issue after the lost elections of 2001 and 2003; not because he himself really believed in 
this line of argument or because the public expected it, but because SNP members pushed 
him. He needed to satisfy both the increasingly loud fundamentalists and the 
gradualists.Salmond’s behaviour was also in large a reaction of unrest in 2006 and 2011 to 
become more concrete on the independence referendum. While postponing the question 
several years, Salmond took action after the 2011 Scottish elections. This is not to say that 
both party leaders were only at the mercy of the waves. Salmond’s choice to limit the answers 
to the question on independence to ‘yes’ and ‘no’, prevented a majority voting for more 
devolution only. The National Conversation pursued by the Scottish government (i.e. 
Salmond as First Minister), which ended up to represent the opinion of the SNP, also 
indicated that Salmond eventually did want a referendum. Besides that, in contrast to 
Swinney, the bad 2005 election results did not lead to a discussion of party leadership. 
However, looking at the points in time when Salmond favoured a more ‘fundamentalist’ view, 
it was always subsequent to earlier SNP unrest. 
 External factors have a much smaller role to play. The SNP confidence in a successful 
independence referendum remained even after the lost 2005 general elections and the negative 
opinion polls on independence throughout the years. Also internally, the idea that not all Scots 
were as interested in independence as the average SNP member, was not heard. The 2006 
debate shows that the bad election results were not considered to last forever: SNP members 
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already speculated among each other (but not with outsiders) about what to do when the party 
was in office.  
The lack of cooperation with other parties can be partly attributed to the other parties’ 
unwillingness, but the SNP itself was not cooperative either. From the re-establishment of the 
Scottish Parliament, it saw the non-inclusion in coalitions and the lack of cooperation when 
the party itself formed the government as natural. While on a superficial level the SNP 
reached out to other parties, the SNP did not really try to negotiate with other parties. This is 
most apparent when the SNP negotiated with the UK government: even then it did not include 
the other Scottish parties.It seemed that some of the conversation’s conclusions also 
corresponded directly with the SNP’s opinion (see for example Scottish Government 2009, 
121).When the SNP government ended the National Conversation, the SNP strengthened its 
position on the autonomy issue. Instead of presenting the successes as the result of the 
devolution process of the last twelve years, the SNP used them as an incentive to opt for 
complete independence. 
 
CiU: from cooperation to conflict in Catalonia 
During the 2000 general elections, the two predecessors of the CiU, the Convergència 
Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) and the Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC) had two 
main objectives. According to their joint manifesto, the defence of the interests of Catalonia 
and the restructuring of the Spanish state should be secured by cooperation on the national 
and regional level with “any party that wins the elections” (CiU 2000, 18). While 
acknowledging that Catalonia differs from the rest of Spain, the CiU opted for a “collective 
future with the nation and its society” (CiU 2000, 18). Over the subsequent years, the CiU 
would more firmly state its ideals for more autonomy and eventually independence. In 
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focusing on the changes and the factors that led to them, the resistance of the national level 
stands out. 
For the regional elections in 2003, the CiU openly advocated a new Statute, a new 
Catalan constitution. The party wanted shared sovereignty between the Spanish state and the 
Comunidades Autónomas (CiU 2003; 101, 102). Although earlier reforms also lead to more 
autonomy, the party had several problems to face. First of all, the sympathy towards the CiU, 
whose two predecessors helped to form the Generalitat in 1980, was decreasing and the polls 
envisioned a victory for the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) (Catalonian 
government 2003). Its leader, former Barcelona mayor Pasqual Maragall i Mira, made clear 
that his party was not just a vehicle of the national socialist party but had a special interest in 
Catalonia itself.iv Stating that Catalonia would see a new “wonder” after 23 years of CDC and 
UDC, he threatened to form a coalition without the CiU. Secondly, there was a change in 
leadership. Jordi Pujol i Soley, leader of the CDC wing of the CiU and president of the 
Generalitat de Catalunya since 1980, decided to step down because of his age, being 73. Artur 
Mas i Gavarró, a fellow CDC member, succeeded him as party leader. According to ms. 
Calelle, “Artur Mas has a politician’s profile of the 21st century while Pujol was more a 
politician of the 20th century. The replacement was an agreement of the entire CiU.”  
A year later, during the national and EU elections, the CiU wanted to decide on the 
direction and the pace of change in Catalonia. If other parties thought alike, then cooperation 
would be possible. Otherwise, there could be no agreement (CiU 2004a, 2). Although the CiU 
was left out of government after the previous regional elections, it did win most seats in the 
regional elections the party was able to turn a lag into a lead. During the election campaign 
for these two elections, the polls revealed stable support from the voters. Apart from that, the 
European Constitution was drafted in June 2004. While the relationship with Spain is 
problematic, the CiU does not opt for Catalan membership of the EU. Instead, the CiU 
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arguedthat for Catalonia to achieve its goals, it would be necessary that Spain dealt more 
effectively with EU legislation and that it understood the common interests of Spain and 
Catalonia (CiU 2004b, 138).  
  
A new statute for Catalonia 
During the 2006 regional elections, the CiU had become more moderate on the topic of 
autonomy. It did not present Madrid as a main problem. In fact, while being in opposition, the 
CiU had managed to play a large role in the formation of a new statute for Catalonia, a 
document it has asked for since the 2003 elections. Its support was necessary for a two third 
majority in the Parliament of Catalonia and the party became themain initiator of the whole 
process. In the election program, the CiU was able to link it to nearly every aspect of ordinary 
life. Since its objective of more autonomy had been achieved, the CiU envisioned new plans 
that could be settled through this Statute (see for example CiU 2006, 22). According to mr. 
De Dalmases, the entire party believed in the necessity of a constitutional reform. When the 
party achieved its goal, many members were satisfied with it and did not want to increase the 
amount of autonomy. 
 The CiU negotiated on to levels. Firstly, the debate that led to a draft text at the 
regional level was dominated by the CiU (Parlament de Catalunya 2006). Secondly, the 
Spanish government talked secretly with multiple Catalonian parties. The CiU gave its 
president, Artur Mas, the authority to bargain and to come to a final agreement. He managed 
to reach an outcome in a long meeting with Prime Minister Zapatero.v While the party needed 
to give in on certain elements, it was clear that Mas outclassed representatives of all 
Catalonian government parties. In Parliament, Catalan president Maragall accused Artur Mas 
of closing the ‘deal’ too eagerly by ignoring the other Catalan parties.  
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Already two years later, Catalan parties were dissatisfied with how the new statute 
functioned in practice. The new PSC Catalan president, José Montilla, asked for the full 
implementation of the statute and the respect of Spanish government for the principle of self-
government.vi In his turn, Spanish prime minister Zapatero accused the Catalan government 
for asking too much of Spain while initiating too little itself.vii The CiU stated that informal 
ruleswere still applied and the national state still invaded the regional policies too often (CiU 
2008, 5-6). To remedy this problem, many competences should shift to the latter. CiU 
demanded Madrid to acknowledge the Catalan interests. This harsh stance resulted mainly 
from criticism of the main wing of the CiU, the CDC.  
While both the CDC and the smaller UDC considered themselves to be nationalist, the 
latter has been more moderate on the issue. Although never striving for upright independence 
before, some CDC leaders wanted autonomy to be deepened and accelerated. In 2007, unrest 
in the CDC caused Duran i Lleida, secretary general of the CiU and leader of the UDC to 
accuse them that they wanted to break with the UDC and wanted to strive for independence 
(CiU 2007). Both Duran and CiU leader Mas tried to prevent that from happening.In autumn, 
Mas introduced a “common house of Catalan nationalism”, implying more focus on 
independence.viii Both parties therefore agreed to disagree; the different positions were 
maintained. In the 2008 CiU general election program, the wish to gain sovereignty was 
stronger advocated. Moreover, the willingness to cooperate with Madrid had mostly 
disappeared. Instead, the CiU demanded Madrid to acknowledge the Catalan interests (2008, 
5-6). 
 
The Statute undermined 
The 2010 regional election program is even more radical than the previous program. The 
internal conflict, however, had not surfaced again and the stances of both wings had remained 
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the same. Since the last elections, in which the CiU won most votes, its support had increased 
and the lead between the CiU and the number two was well above the ten percentage points 
from the start of 2010 (Catalonian government 2010). At the national level, developments 
were taking place. In June 2010, the Constitutional Court of Spain declared that “[t]he 
interpretation of the references to ‘Catalonia as a nation’ and to ‘the national reality of 
Catalonia’ in the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia had no legal effect” (Tribunal 
Constitucional 2010). The capacity of the Generalitat of Catalonia to establish and regulate 
local government taxes was also declared null and void (Tribunal Constitucional 2010). Many 
other articles needed to be interpreted by terms decided on by the Tribunal.  
A mass protest was organised in Barcelona onthe 10th of July. The sources differ with 
regard to the size of the protest, ranging from 50.000 people to 1.500.000 people. 
Nevertheless, there were representatives of very different organisations, from trade unions to 
FC Barcelona. Most political parties supported the protest, and Artur Mas, leader of the CiU, 
walked along with the masses.  
The next election program for the regional elections onthe 28th of November revealed 
the political consequence of the Court’s decision. The CiU openly discussed the question of 
independence. “Now is the time to recover the full potential [of the Catalan institutions], 
especially the Generalitat of Catalonia as a governing body” (CiU 2010, 137-138). “Of 
principal importance” was the institutional crisis; the relationship with Madrid has 
deteriorated, especially since the Spanish Constitutional Court was critical about the Statute. 
Therefore, “the constitutional agreement during the time of the transition has found its limit” 
(CiU 2010, 6). According to the CiU, it was legitimate to achieve independence if that helped 
the needs and demands of Catalonia. 
 The CiU, back in office again by forming a minority government, did not soften its 
tone anymore in the election program for the national campaign of 2011. After again 
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criticizing Madrid and especially the Constitutional Court, the federation argued that it 
wanted “to deepen and enhance our democracy and make more effective the principle of 
popular sovereignty” (CiU 2011, 107). According to the CiU, a “new stage” had begun when 
the federation won the regional elections in 2010. Since then, there “has been a commitment 
to the right to decide” (CiU 2011, 127). The program also mentioned the public outcries 
against Madrid. Between autumn 2009 and spring 2011, 552 of the almost thousand Catalan 
municipalities organized plebiscites, in which the population was asked whether it wanted 
Catalonia to become an independent state. The main answer, yes, did not come as a surprise, 
although the turnout rate differed considerably (Muñoz and Guinjoan 2013, 52). In Barcelona, 
90% of the voters voted in favour of independence. A year and a half later, on the 11th of 
September, the Catalan capital was the scene of a large protest for independence. With 
approximate one and a half million people it probably was even larger than the 2010 
demonstration.Artur Mas and Spanish prime minister Rajoy tried to come to a  financial 
agreement; when negotiations failed, Mas decided to call for new regional elections. 
 In its 2012 regional election program, Catalunya 2020, the CiU enumerated all reasons 
why it had to come this far: the decision of the Tribunal, made by “illegitimate judges against 
the wishes of a majority of the people” (CiU 2012, 10), the demonstrations in Barcelona with 
the slogan “We are one nation. We decide” (CiU 2012, 10), and “Catalonia, new state in 
Europe” (CiU 2012, 11) and the CiU’s victory in the 2010 regional elections. No pro Madrid 
party played a major role; the ‘large winner’ of the elections being another nationalist party, 
which had been and stayed relatively small. The CiU signed the Agreement for Freedom with 
this party, the leftist ERC, in which plans for an independence referendum were presented 
(CiU and ERC 2012, 2). In January 2013, the Parliament of Catalonia passed the Declaració 
de sobirania i del dret a decider del poble de Catalunya, in which the referendum was 
mentioned (Parlament de Catalunya 2013). All CiU deputies voted in favour. 
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Table III. Important events for the Convergència I Unió 
Year Event Influence 
2003 Election of Mas as 
party leader 
+ 
2003 Decreasing sympathy + 
2006 Statute for Catalonia ++ 
2007-
2008 
Unrest in the CDC 
and subsequently the 
CiU  
+ 
2010 The Constitutional 
Court ruled on the 
Statute 
++ 
2010 Mass protests + 
2010 The CiU forms a 
minority government 
++ 
++ = large influence, + = some influence, - = no influence  
 
In the period under study, the CiU had a period of moderation in 2006 as well as a period of 
radicalisation after 2010. Both periods are linked to the role of the Statute of Catalonia, which 
gave Catalonia the degree of autonomy that the CiU envisaged. In 2006, the party was heard 
at the national level; in fact, it was the only major party that negotiated with the Spanish 
government on the new Statute. It furthered its interests and changed Catalan politics 
irrespective of the views of other parties at the regional level, which made the party relatively 
independent from the actions of other parties. While the party became more radical in 2003 
when the socialist party did better in the polls and became more pro Catalan, in other 
elections the party did not change its position due to other parties. In general, the CiU did not 
cooperate with other parties at the regional level, whether it was in opposition or in 
government. When the Statute was partly revoked by the Constitutional Court, the party 
immediately reacted before the mass protests. Nevertheless, these mass protests were used as 
another argument to strengthen the case of independence. 
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Concerning internal stability, the consensus between the CDC, the UDC and the party 
elite in good and in bad times becomes apparent. When the new Statute entered into force, no 
group sought to alter party policy or to advocate more rights. Moreover, no group questioned 
the party elite. The only large internal struggle, in 2007-2008, dealt with the de facto reality 
that the Statute brought: the CDC wanted to ensure that the Statute’s rights were respected. 
This is the only period that the party leadership needed to react on internal risks and where the 
party radicalised due to internal pressures. The general election program of 2008 was vague 
enough to be inspired both from the CDC’s new party statutes, which sought “full national 
recognition of the full sovereignty of Catalonia” (CDC 2008, 5), adopted a few months 
earlier, and the UDC position. This vagueness was earlier applied to the role and the power of 
the UDC and CDC within the CiU, since the relationship was never strictly defined. Due to 
the solution in the election program, a new fight between the factions was prevented. When 
the issue is resolved, the position of key members of the CiU and factions were 
unquestioned.In 2010, all CiU actors respond directly to the ruling of the Spanish 
Constitutional Court and all participate in mass demonstrations: the CiU party members 
among the masses, the party elite at the forefront.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Table IV. Influence of factors on the N-VA, SNP and CiU 
 N-VA SNP CiU 
National level ++ + ++ 
Regional parties + - + 
People - - + 
Internal leadership ++ + + 
Factions + ++ + 
 
++ = large influence, + = some influence, - = no influence  
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Table IV clarifies that influence at the national level is the most influential external factor and 
the existence of factions the main internal factor concerning regionalist parties’ change. 
Concerning the former, the party’s influencedoes not necessarily need to be the result of 
cooperation with other parties within the region or with actors at the national level. Whether 
other parties or actors act friendly or hostile is not the issue, the question for the regionalist 
parties is whether their wishes resulted in actual realisation at both levels. The focus in the 
literature on cooperation should therefore pay more attention to actual influence on policy 
issues, since it is not the idea of being accepted that affects regionalist parties, but whether 
concrete results are established. Contrary to Massetti and Schakel (2013), even when 
decentralisation actually occurs, no party radicalise to save its skin. The findings are more in 
line with Alonso (2012) and Colino (2009): when there is a stalemate and no result can be 
achieved, the parties radicalise. The factor seems to be a sufficient cause for regionalist 
parties to change their issue position, since a change of national influence is followed by a 
policy reaction while other external factors could be excluded. This is not to say that the 
regional influence was absent; the N-VA and CiU reacted on other parties as well, though to a 
lesser degree. The SNP however did not respond at all to other parties while it did alter its 
policy.  
 The influence of the population was absent. This may result from the regionalist 
parties’ propensity to focus on followers instead of on the general public, but at least a small 
change was hypothesized. The SNP, however, did not alter its issue position while the polls 
on independence showed negative results for years. The CiU had already changed its issue 
position severely when the population of Catalonia started to protest for independence. This is 
in line with the influence of party members instead of the electorate, as explained below. The 
manifestation of the public opinion as a mass protest was not mentioned in the literature, and 
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its relevance is still unclear. For the CiU, it served as an argument for independence but since 
the demonstrations were partly orchestrated by the party, the causal relationship is unclear. 
The role of the European Union is also absent: the 2004 expansion and the 2009 Lisbon 
Treaty were mentioned, but merely served as an argument for the parties’ position instead of 
leading to issue change.‘Europe’ was used more often by the SNP than by the CiU and N -VA, 
which corresponded with the fact that the UK had more regional blindness than Spain and 
Belgium. But this difference alone is not a sign for a causal mechanism between the EU and 
issue position. Both of the two external factors seemto be neither sufficient nor necessary, 
since no major change occurs and other external factors are present. 
 With regard to internal factors, the party systemness as described by Panebianco plays 
a large role. Both the CiU and the SNP experienced an uprising of a faction, i.e. the CDC in 
2007/2008 and the ‘fundamentalists’ in 2004 and 2006. Since the CiU contains another formal 
faction, the UDC, and is of itself relatively autonomous, the criticism had a smaller effect than 
that of the SNP members, which party is much more homogenous and no formal factions 
exist. Apart from systemness, the attitude of the factions needs to be taken into account. 
While the fundamentalists and gradualist’s schism is degenerative, both CiU factions are 
cooperative in nature. While the CiU and especially the SNP can be placed at the activist-
dominated point at the continuum of Schumacher, De Vries and Vis, the N-VA can be placed 
at the other end, as a leadership-dominated niche party. The hierarchical structure of the N-
VA made it easier for the party elite to enforce its own policy choices upon the N-VA 
members, as envisioned by Greene and Haber (2015). In that sense, the absence of factions is 
still an influential factor for the N-VA. Nevertheless, the activist attitude, visible in party 
conferences in all three regionalist parties, created a policy that conformed much more to the 
party members than to the electorate at large. The general debate even excluded party voters, 
focusing mostly on the members, in contrast with the findings of Ezrow et al. (2010) and 
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Schumacher (2013). There may be no substantial difference in ideology between the two 
groups, but that alone does not justify the incorporation of party voters, since the link between 
the party debates and the voters is lacking. 
 Regionalist parties should be more firmly placed within the category of niche 
parties.There may be a debate whether the non-economic nature of the parties’ goalsor the 
organisational set-up defines a niche party, but the regionalist party satisfies both types. More 
importantly, the factors that result in policy change in other niche parties play a large role for 
regionalist parties as well. Inclusion can contribute to a better understanding of policy change 
in regionalist parties, since concepts and theories in niche party literature are more developed 
than those in the regionalist party literature. Besides that, it could reduce the seemingly sui 
generis nature of regionalist parties, which resulted in a focus on external factors instead of 
internal party factors. Specific characteristics of this type of parties, such as the relationship 
with the national level, should be recognised, but it should not lead to a discussion of these 
parties in a vacuum. Niche party literature could also benefit from inclusion, since niche 
parties are often considered to be extreme right or extreme left parties. Since many European 
states decentralise and the national-regional relationship plays an important role in issue 
change, the regional level as such could also become more important in the niche parties 
literature. 
 The research itself is mainly explorative. Investigating many different factors limited 
the possibility to focus on those that appeared to be more influential. Particularly the insights 
of external factors were hampered by the lack of data, which  resulted in Collier’s more 
implicit causal links. Since process-tracing requires the presence of all links, the lack of data 
weakened the research. Concerning internal factors, interviews are always a potential 
problem. They diminish the chance that relevant factors are left out of the picture, but when 
no other information is available, one needs to trust that current party members are as honest 
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as possible or the validity may diminish. Nevertheless, the advantages still outweigh the 
disadvantages.  
The research did not discover any factor that was not found in the literature. The mass 
protests in Catalonia were, however, a different manifestation of the public opinion and were 
not mentioned in the literature. New interactions among factors were not found, apart from 
the effect of influence of the party on internal debates. This is not a deficit of the research, 
since finding new factors or interactions for the sake of finding them is pointless. On the 
contrary, it shows that the debate on niche parties and on regionalist parties, while arguing 
over specific mechanisms, focuses on the right factors.  
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Annex I. List of interviewees 
 
The party members who have been interviewed are current members of the party’s executive 
board and/or current deputies. They have been party members for a considerable length of 
time (sometimes since its establishment), so they experienced the main events of the last 
fifteen years as (top) party members. Since they are partly responsible for the party’s policy, 
validity and reliability would be jeopardized when they are the only source of information. 
However, when most factual information as well as the position of other party members is 
already known from other sources and the interviewee’s answers can be placed in the context, 
then the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. Apart from mr. Smith, no SNP party 
member nor the secretariat responded to multiple requests. 
 
Table I. List of interviewees 
Name Party 
(faction) 
Position Method Date 
Silvia Calelle CiU (UDC) Member of the 
secretariat’s council 
By phone 14 June 2014 
Francesc de 
Dalmases 
CiU (CDC) Adviser of the 
Secretariat 
By phone 15 January 2015 
Sander Loones N-VA Member of the 
European 
Parliament, vice-
president of the party 
Meeting at the 
N-VA 
headquarters in 
Brussels 
27 May 2014 
Alyn Smith SNP 
(gradualist) 
Member of the 
European 
Parliament, member 
of the National 
Executive 
Committee 
Meeting at the 
European 
Parliament in 
Brussels 
5 June 2014 
Kris Van Dijck N-VA Member of the party 
council, former 
secretary 
Meeting at the 
Flemish 
Parliament in 
Brussels 
10 June 2014 
 
                                                                 
i
 A. McKay. “Interview – John Swinney Feint,” The Scotsman, 4 June 2001. 
ii
G. Seenan. “SNP leader resigns after poor Euro poll results,” The Guardian, 23 June 2004. 
iii
 P. Hutcheon, “Nationalists earmark 2010 for referendum on independence,” Herald Scotland, 24 March 2007. 
iv
 “Maragall promote a los empresarios una Catalunya,” La Vanguardia, 28 October 2003. 
v
 “Que las Cortes nos reconozcan como nación es un gran mensaje de futuro,” El Mundo, 19 February 2006. 
vi
 “Montilla l lama a aplicar el Estatut como continuidad del pacto constituyente,” Agencia EFE, 2 June 2008. 
vii
 “El presidente advierte a Montil la que el Estatut no impone al Gobierno lo que debe hacer,” La Vanguardia, 
15 August 2008. 
viii
 “El nou desafiament per a Duran i Mas,” El Periódico de Catalonia, 16 September 2007. 
